Introduction
Concerns that certain public interests, such as environmental protection, public health or sustainability, may not be well served by competition has directed some antitrust agencies to weigh in their decisions other public interests than just competition. Restrictive agreements among competitors may take away negative externalities, such as industrial pollution, or ease commons problems, just by reducing output. 1 The more sophisticated argument is that when a horizontal agreement in restriction of competition amongst competitors actively promotes some wider public interest more than it harms consumers by its anticompetitive eects, the agreement should be exempted from the cartel law. 2 The U.S. antitrust authorities and courts have resisted calls to consider wider public policy arguments on welfare merits against combinations in restraint of trade. In National Society of Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that competition would produce inferior engineering work endangering public safety as a justication for suppression of price competition in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court held that even if competition would conict with professional standards, that would be a matter of regulation, and "... not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition." 3 The European Commission, however, has been more receptive to public interest-defense arguments.
In CECED, a landmark decision from 1999, it exempted horizontal agreements between manufacturers of washing machines to discontinue the production of their least energy-ecient models from the European cartel law, on the conclusion that the agreements would on balance bring about energy and water bill savings, as well as environmental benets for society in excess of their negative eects from reduced competition. 4 The 2001 Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements contained a separate chapter on allowing environmental agreements. While the Commission has since been reluctant to grant cartel exemptions on these grounds, recently there has been a revival in some Member States. 5 The Dutch Ministry of Economic Aairs in May 2014 by law obliged the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) to weigh whether "... in agreements that restrict competition made in order to promote sustainability, a fair share of the improvements benets`users' in the long run." 6 The seminal case concerned an agreement between Dutch energy companies to close down ve coal burning power plants, as part of the Dutch Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth, a nation-wide 1 Adler (2004) , for examples, argues that antitrust interventions in the California sardine shery led to over-shing and environmental damage. Crane (2005) suggests that United States Tobacco's monopolization attempts of the snu tobacco market increased welfare through health improvements and health-care costs savings from lower tobacco consumption.
2 See Townley (2009) and Kingston (2011) . 3 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 435 U. S. 679 (1978) . See also Werden (2014) . 4 Commission Decision, Case IV.F.1/36.718, CECED, 24 January 1999. The exemption was given under paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU. It was shortly after stretched to include dishwashers and water heaters as well. See European Commission, "Commission approves agreements to reduce energy consumption of dishwashers and water heaters," IP/01/1659, Brussels, 26 November 2001. 5 The revised 2011 Guidelines no longer mentions the possibility for exemption, and in several cases the Commission has not accepted the argument. For example, in Case COMP/39579, Consumer Detergents of 13 April 2011, it ned a trade association initiative that claimed to improve the environmental performance of detergent products as a cartel. 6 Policy rule Competition and Sustainability, nr. WJZ / 14052830, 6 May 2014 (in Dutch) .
contract to switch to green energy, initiated by the Ministry. The ACM considered the agreement collusive and gave an informal view that the closure of the plants, which accounted for approximately 10% of the Dutch generating capacity, would harm consumers by leading to higher energy prices.
The environmental benets for the Dutch consumers were deemed insucient to compensate their harm from increased energy prices, in particular because the lower CO 2 emissions in the Netherlands would be oset by higher emissions by plants in neighboring countries acquiring the surplus emission allowances through the EU system of emissions trading (ETS) and using them, which would still aect the Dutch. 7 Another informal view the agency gave in Chicken of Tomorrow. This case involved poultry farmers, broiler meat processors and Dutch supermarkets, who responded to a public outcry against the poor living conditions of chicken in factory farms -referred to by an animal rights organization as`exploding chicken' ("plofkip") -by making arrangements to sell chicken meat produced under enhanced animal welfare-friendly conditions. Among other things, supermarkets agreed to remove regular chicken meat from their shelves. The ACM prohibited the agreement as collusive, after concluding from questionnaires that although consumers were willing to pay 0.82 euro/kilo for more sustainable chicken meat on average, with a 1.46 euro/kilo price rise they would not benet from the initiative on balance. 8 Cartel coordination may in theory improve upon the classic under-provision of public goods in unregulated economies that results from free-riding. 9 Arguably also the industries concerned will have superior knowledge and special skills to actively promote public interests in their sectors through selfregulation. They would know best air pollution control systems, cradle-to-cradle designs or humane farm animal care, as well as any latent willingness to pay with consumers for more socially responsible and sustainable production, such as green energy or fair trade products. Private companies may therefore be the most innovative and ecient producers also of certain public interests. 10 However, admitting the public interest-defense for cartel oenses raises some immediate concerns.
Horizontal agreements are known to carry direct and indirect risks of collusion, including higher prices and lower quality of products and variety. 11 Allowing collusion hardly creates private incentives to 7 See ACM (2013) and Kloosterhuis & Mulder (2015) . 8 The ACM asked consumers to compare two discretely dierent market situations, one with and one without the exploding chicken on oer in supermarkets, thus including a collective switch to more animal friendly chicken meat production for the Dutch market. See ACM (2015) . 9 We note that legally a horizontal agreement that is exempted under Article 101(3) is not a cartel. We nevertheless refer in this paper to a horizontal agreement with anticompetitive eects in the meaning of Article 101(1) in brief as à cartel',`cartel agreement' or`collusion'.
10 See Shleifer (1998) . Coase (1974) famously claimes that lighthouses, which Paul Samuelson had made a textbook example of services that could only be provided by the government, were in fact in late 19th century Britain eciently built and operated by private individuals that were granted the right by the government to levy tolls on passing ships calling at British ports. While Coase's lighthouse case has been criticized as a pure example of ecient private production of a public good because of the government backing, a cartel exemption would be like that. However, as Bertrand (2006) documents, the statutory authority at the time, Trinity House, also imposed strict quality requirements for the building, maintenance and operation of lighthouses, while excludability from port services enforced the levying of the tolls. Also, several privately owned lighthouses needed to be taken over by Trinity House when their service was neglected.
11 Fonseca & Normann (2012) reports experimental evidence that talking helps collusion, which is continued after communication is disabled. Duso et al. (2013) establishes empirically that networks between competitors participating 3 promote sustainability suciently, even when consumers do have a willingness to pay for it. 12 While corporations may want to be seen taking social responsibility, the actual eects thereof need not exceed what suces for self-promotion. 13 Moreover, it is not clear why stimulating more corporate social responsibility would require a restriction of competition.
Also, many public interest benets are hard to quantify as a mitigating factor. Sustainability appears to be suciently widely interpretable a concept to invite overly rosy contribution claims. The policy burdens antitrust agencies with a complex monitoring and balancing task. Objectionable cartels may misuse the policy in an attempt to get away with hard core collusion under the guise of green.
As a result, the availability of the public interest-defense can undermine deterrence.
In this paper, we formalize the antitrust balancing of cartel damages against public interest benets, supposing that the latter can somehow only be had by a horizontal industry-wide agreement. We restrict public interests to public goods, in conformity with the cartel benets in our leading examples, which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. No individual can be excluded from an improved environment, public health or better animal well-being, nor does anyone's enjoyment thereof take away from someone else's. The policy then amounts to government mandating an industry to collude to impose a unit tax on the private consumption good(s) it produces, provided that part of the proceeds are contributed to one or more public goods that compensate the consumers of the private good(s) for the harm caused by the cartel price overcharge. Samuelson (1954) determines that the ecient level of public good provision is where sum of the marginal rates of substitution of all individuals is equal to the economy's marginal rate of transformation between the public good and any private good. Lindahl (1958) suggests individuals be taxed personalized prices, so as to contribute their marginal willingness to pay at the optimal level of the public good, times that level, for government to provide. The maximum willingness to pay for changes in the availability of a public good is a compensating variation. 14 The social demand curve for a public good is the aggregation of all individuals' willingness to pay for each level of that public good.
Without coordination, public goods will be under-provided and Olson (1965) designates the provision of public goods in larger economies a government task. In practice, it is complex to implement optimal public goods production, as it requires private information about preferences that people would have an incentive not to reveal. Optimal taxation theory seeks to design tax-subsidy schemes for nancing public goods that achieve eciency without specic knowledge about the individual preferences, including by targeting revealed consumption patterns. 15 Even though incentive-compatible in R&D joint ventures in the US are conducive to collusion. Awaya & Krishna (2016) models how cheap talk within a cartel makes equilibria possible with near-perfect collusion by improving monitoring.
12 Schinkel & Spiegel (2016) shows that when consumers value sustainable products and rms choose investments in sustainability before output, coordination of sustainability actually reduces it. A production cartel will invest more in sustainability, but harms consumers. The requirement to compensate consumers again reduces investments in sustainability below the competitive level.
13 See Delmas & Montes-Sancho (2010) . 14 See Hanemann (1991) . 15 See Boadway & Keen (1993) on the use of observables, including revealed preferences and self-selection, to determine implementation schemes do exist, government policy can only be second-best. 16 We examine the trade-o between the cartel's public interest benets against a unit price overcharge, using a standard public economics model with private consumption and voluntary public goods contributions. Heterogeneous individuals spend their endowment on a private good, a public good, and a composite commodity. Depending on relative preferences and the wealth distribution, some or all consumers of the private good also contribute to the public good. The cartel price rise has various substitution and income eects. The public interest-cartel's compensating contribution crowds out private contributions, as individuals free-ride on the public good contributions by others. For example can improvements in the energy eciency of appliances be oset by lax morals in their use. With improved living conditions for chicken overall, some consumers may switch from buying high-end free range chicken to a generic biological brand.
We nd that contrary to the Samuelson condition the public good level a cartel is required to produce in compensation decreases in consumers' willingness to pay for the public good. A cartel cannot produce the ecient public good supply if there is some crowding out. Moreover, the public interest-defense policy in essence targets exactly those individuals with a relatively low preference for the public good, to pay most for it, which is orthogonal to Lindahl-pricing. As a result, the industry can aord the required compensation from the cartel proceeds only in quite special circumstances, in which suciently many consumers have relative preferences for the private and the public good that stays constant within narrow bounds. In addition, the information requirements for a competition agency to identify a genuine public interest-defense seem too large for the policy to be practical.
Our analysis builds on a literature that studies government provision of the public good in economies with voluntary private contributions. Pareto improvements can be obtained through commodity taxation in such economies, and eciency in public good provision via lump-sum taxation. However, if consumers anticipate that the government will use the tax revenue to nance purchases of the public good, they adjust their own public good spendings. Bergstrom et al. (1986) show that for income redistributions smaller than the initial individual voluntary contributions to the public good, crowding out of government spending on the public good by lump sum taxation is full. Bernheim (1986) establishes a similar neutrality result for`distortionary' taxation on labor income as well, provided consumption bundles do not change. The latter is obtained by government also setting labor incomes and spending all revenues only on the one of two public goods to which all consumers are contributors. Andreoni & Bergstrom (1996) See Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) , Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971) and Walker (1981) . 17 See Boadway et al. (1989) .
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compensating contribution is typically not fully crowded out. Also we do not impose a balanced budget, as not all cartel prots need to be contributed to the public good. Our model furthermore has only one public good and includes a third, composite commodity, so that consumers can substitute away from the cartellized product and mitigate the damage.
Closest to our application, the public goods model with private contributions has been used to study the extent to which corporate social responsibility may contribute to public interests. Bagnoli & Watts (2003) shows that rm contributions to a public good when consumers are socially responsible vary across market structures. Besley & Ghatak (2007) nds that corporate social responsibility does not improve upon private voluntary contributions. Kotchen (2006) conrms that in`green markets', which oer bundled private and public goods, company contributions to more sustainable production are often neutralized by reduced consumer donations. In suciently large economies can green technology increase the general level of provision, despite crowding out all private provision of the associated environmental public good.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the policy. In Section 3
we formalize the trade-o involved in compensating consumers for price increases in the private good industry by rm-provided public goods to study the extent to which it can contribute to welfare. In Section 4 we examine sustainability for constant elasticity of substitution utility functions. In Section 5
we discuss alternative welfare measures to the policy. Section 6 concludes on some policy implications and extensions. Derivations are provided in the appendix.
2
The Public Interest-Defense Policy
The keystone for the public interest-defense policy is in the European Treaty provision under paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU that the prohibition of all agreements between rms which have as their object or eect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, may be declared inapplicable if such an agreement: "...contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benet." In essence, the policy stretches the eciency gains here intended by the drafters to include the advance of wider public interest such as more sustainable production.
The conditions to qualify for a cartel exemption under Article 101(3) are that: (i) the benets must be objective and clearly visible; (ii) the restrictions must be indispensable to obtain the benets;
(iii) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benets, and (iv) competition in the market in question should not be fully eliminated. In principle all four conditions would need to be fullled to mount a successful public interest-defense. However, in practice there is no clarity on what exactly constitutes sucient residual competition and so condition (iv) is hardly enforced.
The European Commission's guidelines explain to condition (iii) that allowing`consumers a fair share' means that the benets of the agreement are passed on, so that: "the net eect of the agreement 6 must at least be neutral from the point of view of those consumers directly or indirectly aected by the 
Public Goods Provision by a Private Cartel
Consider an economy with n individuals i = 1, ..., n, who each spend their income between consuming a private good x that is produced by an industry that is considered for a public interest-cartel exemption, a composite commodity y that represents all other consumption of goods supplied on markets that remain unchanged, and making a private contribution g i to the total public good
in which g N ≥ 0 is the initial provision of the public good by nature and g F ≥ 0 is a rm contribution.
If the public good is clean air, g i ≥ 0 can be investments in the installation of solar panels, for example, soot lters on cars or a more sustainable consumption pattern. In the following, we denote by G −i the amount of public good contributions by other individuals than individual i. We abstract from simple direct volume reduction eects from collusive price increases of consumption goods that generate negative (production) externalities, so that the public interest is measured entirely by G and Individual i's preferences are represented by utility function U i (x i , y i , G), which is twice continuously dierentiable and increasing in each argument, with marginal utilities of consumption being positive and decreasing in each argument, so that all individuals consume a positive amount of all goods. 23 We assume a minimal degree of substitutability between the three goods in the economy.
Pricing are normalized as (p x , 1, p g ), in which p g can be thought of as the cost of producing the public good from contributions. Individual i decides on how to optimally allocate his wealth endowment w i over private consumption and contributing to the public good as follows:
Note that if left unconstrained, the optimal individual contribution to the public good may well be zero or negative, in particular when there is already a high initial provision of the public good by nature. If the air was pure and pollution-free, it would be unlikely that people invested into making it even cleaner. Similarly, low wealth endowments or a low preference for the public good can prevent individuals from spending their own resources on it. However, substantial individual diminutions of the public good are not natural to our concerns. While, for example, individual consumers may, in the knowledge that others invest in clean air, relax their own emissions, such compensations do not convert obviously into cash.
The socially optimal total level of public good satises the Samuelson condition, which relative to the privately produced good x is that
It is denoted by G S .
22 Note that it may as well be that the production of substitutes to the cartellized good, i.e. of products in y i , has osetting negative externalities that we also ignore with this assumption. 23 For analytical convenience, it is assumed that U i satises:
= 0 for all z ∈ {G, x, y}. Note that while these assumptions on preferences ensure that x i > 0 and y i > 0 in the optimum, it may still be optimal for the consumer to want to purchase negative amounts of the public good if his total public goods consumption remains positive thanks to contributions from other sources. For this reason, it is assumed that g i ≥ 0. It is often binding amounting to important corner solutions. In the competitive benchmark equilibrium, a large number of identical rms produce the private good x at zero economic prots. Naturally g F = 0, as the rms will not voluntarily contribute. Let individual i 's optimal purchase bundle be (x * i , y * i , g * i ), and so
Note that while individuals are price takers, they do react to each others' behavior through the public good. When g * i > 0, individual i is a contributor. Otherwise, he is a non-contributor with g * i = 0. Someone is more likely to be a contributor if his wealth is suciently high, public good contributions from other sources are low, if he values the public good more compared to the other goods, or if the prices of the other goods are high.
Assuming that all the goods are normal goods and that there is a single-valued demand function for the public good, everybody taking the contributions of others as given, there exists a competitive Nash equilibrium with a unique quantity of the public good and unique sets of contributors and noncontributors. 24 The structure of the utility functions assures that if g N = 0 and there is no provision by rms either, at least some consumers will purchase the public good. In fact, if G = 0, every consumer has an incentive to contribute. For positive initial levels of g N it can be that no individual privately contributes. In competitive equilibrium there is classic under-provision of the public good. 25 Individual i's indirect utility is
in which W is a vector of the wealths of all consumers, which are all relevant through the determination of G * .
Collusive Provision of the Public Good
The public-interest justication for a cartel oense amounts to allowing the industry a price increase p c x > p x , in exchange for the industry contributing to the public good, g F > 0. 26 Each policy option 24 The equilibrium existence and uniqueness proof is analogous to that in Bergstrom et al. (1986) , with the only additional aspect being the composite commodity y i , which does not aect the proof materially. Apart from the inequality constraint for private contributions to the public good, each consumer's optimization problem is a standard demand problem with income w i + G −i . Denoting f i (w) individual i 's demand function for the public good and assuming it is single-valued, individual i 's contribution becomes
, by the inequality constraint. This is a continuous function from a compact and convex set on itself, so that existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem. The proof of uniqueness is more complex and follows Bergstrom et al. (1986) verbatim, with an additional sucient assumption that the marginal propensity to consume the public good is a dierentiable function of wealth satisfying 0 < f i (w) < 1 for all i = 1, .., n. In the model in Section 4, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is proven by construction directly, allowing also for a higher marginal propensity to consume the public good.
25 See Bergstrom et al. (1986) . 26 Note that if the cartel would apply nonlinear pricing, the xed price components would be comparable to lump sum taxation, while also demanding compensation as a cartel damage. Since the neutrality result of Bergstrom et al. (1986) 9 has a unique Nash equilibrium:
. Partial equilibrium comparative statics captures the main eects at play in the public interest-defense. With respect to the composite commodity and the cost of producing the public good, ignoring general equilibrium price eects can be interpreted as the market for the private good being small relative to the rest of the economy. For the relevant market of the private good, it is less innocuous. In particular would the decrease in the demand for the private good resulting from the cartel price increase in general equilibrium decrease p x , so that it depends on the model specications whether the net eect on the price of the private good will indeed be positive, and compensation be required. This demand eect is second-order, however, and counteracted by the crowding-out eect.
Typically, a cartel will raise prices above competitive levels, with various eects identied below.
As we seek to characterize a consumer welfare status quo, we need not account for any surplus cartel prot net of compensation. Also note that the agreement would be legal if exempted, so that it is contractable with side-payments and we can ignore issues of cartel stability.
In principle, cartel provision of the public good has the potential to improve upon the underprovision in competitive equilibrium and compensate the price increase. The extent to which it can depends on the interplay of several eects. In response to the cartel price increase of x, three things will happen. First, consumers will substitute away from the cartellized private good, either to the composite commodity or by making a larger public good donation, or both. These substitution eects mitigate their individual harm from the price increase directly, and larger contributions to the public good also benet others. Second, the increase in p x has negative real income eects, which reduce the consumption of x, y and g, which are all assumed to be normal goods.
Third, there may be crowding out eects with contributors, as increases in G −i may induce lower own contributions, including to stop contributing at all. Non-contributors enjoy the increased level of public good provided, and in border cases can be induced by the increase in p x to start purchasing the public good. Generally, however, the substitution eect towards the public good are at least partially oset by the income and crowding out eects. In addition, the industry's compensation contribution g F > 0 will further crowd out private contributions to the public good and increase the demand for the private and composite commodity in the collusive equilibrium. applies to the xed fee part, so that compensation is ever more expensive, it is unlikely that a cartel would opt for nonlinear cartel pricing in the context of a public interest-defense. On balance, the net utility change for individual i from allowing a public-interest cartel is
which increases in g F .
Interpreting the compensation requirement to mean that the consumers of the private good are to be compensated on average, and assuming a cardinal comparison possible by the weighted sum of individual utilities, using weight α i for the utility of individual i -or its type -as a welfare function, the cartel is to ensure that
Obviously, dierent weights and dierent utility functions amount to interchangeable variations in social welfare. In linear approximation, condition (4) is
since all consumers consume a positive amount of the cartellized good. 27 Firms have no incentive to contribute more than minimally required and so seek to establish condition (4) − (5) with equality, if at all. Let the minimally required compensating level of rm public good contribution beĝ F . The competition authority should only accept the public interest-defense if the level of the public good actually provided by the cartel is at leastĝ F . To make this kind of complex assessment requires of lot of the competition authority, including perfect information of preferences and perfect monitoring of rm behavior.
In the remainder of this section we study to what extent the policy can contribute to welfare, which turns out to depend crucially on whether or not there are private contributions to the public good. In Section 3.2.1 we analyze an economy with no private contributors to the public good. In Section 3.2.2
we consider economies in which at least one individual is a contributor. For analytical convenience, we assume that the set of contributors is invariant across the policies.
An Economy with No Contributors
If g N is suciently high, no individual contributes to the public good in either of the periods and
The equilibrium purchases of each consumer depend only on own wealth and prices of the private good and the composite commodity. The indirect utility function becomes
since only nature and the rms provide the public good. The collusive increase in p x causes individual i a marginal harm of
The cartel damage is expressed in the rst right-hand term, through the consumption of x, mitigated by consumption of y and further substitution towards the composite commodity in the second term.
The utility losses will be distributed unevenly. Unsurprisingly, those who like the private good the most will suer the highest utility decline. Also wealthy consumers are hurt more.
Compensation condition approximation (5) for a discrete price change for which all individuals remain non-contributors becomes
Note that while the term
in (5) generally will be negative, it may be positive for individuals who care little for the private consumption good, yet benet from other people's substitution eects toward the public good.
which holding with equality implicitly denesĝ F > 0.
Note that while it may appear that in an economy with only non-contributors there is no willingness to pay for more public good than the status quo, this need not be so. There is under-provision in the competitive no-contributors equilibrium that may well be improved upon by coordination. If a suciently large proportion of individuals has a high enough willingness to pay for the public good, even though too low to privately contribute, consumers can be compensated on average. However, a private cartel is not well incentivized to provide public goods optimally, as the following result illustrates.
Proposition 1. In a no-contributors economy,ĝ F decreases in
∂G for all i = 1, ..., n. Proof. By assumption, marginal utility of the public good
∂G is decreasing for each individual. In a no private contributors economy, there are no substitution eects of the rms' provision of the public good. As a result, an increase in an individual marginal willingness to pay for G on the full range of U i amounts to higher utility gain from each additional unit of g F provided by the rms, thus lowering the compensating level of public good for individual i and the average compensationĝ F .
The policy goes against the Samuelson condition: rather than increasing the level of the public good when there is a higher marginal willingness to pay for it, a cartel will only need to invest less in compensating public good. The reason is that for the same price rise, consumers are compensated on average with a lower amount of public good if one or more of them value the public good more. The cartel will only produce the bare minimum of compensation required.
It nevertheless may be possible to nd social welfare weights (α 1 , ..., α n ) such thatĝ F by compensation requirement (7) implements the Samuelson condition (2) for a given price increase p c x . Such weights exist by the fundamental theorem of algebra, and in real non-negative numbers for a subset of utility functions. Government can therefore make the policy work for no-contributors economies by a suitable choice of welfare function, provided it has perfect information.
An Economy with Contributors
In an economy with at least one contributor, a willingness to pay for the public good is revealed. The change in a contributing consumer i 's equilibrium utility brought about by a small increment in p x then becomes 13
Individual i 's marginal equilibrium utility gain from rm provision of the public good is
where the set of arguments (.) are the terms exogenous to the individual, i.e. (p x , p g , W, g N + g F ).
Substituting (8) and (9) into (5) holding with equality implicitly denesĝ F > 0.
It should be more easy to compensate individuals that are already contributing to the public good.
In fact, some individuals may actually gain utility when p x increases, from increases in the public good contributions by others as they substitute away from x. This is reected in the term
which is non-negative and eectively represents a mitigation of consumers' harm. Since the increase in p c x > p x andĝ F > 0 occur simultaneously, some individuals may benet from both. However, there will always be contributing consumers in the economy harmed by the price increase as well. In addition, among contributors the term
is non-positive, so that there is crowding out of their private contributions by the cartel provision. Some contributors may become non-contributors in response to the cartel's contribution. The crowding out need not be complete, however, and the marginal benet from the cartel's public good provision is always positive.
With at least one individual contributing privately to the public good, the policy need no longer always be contrary to the Samuelson condition. It may be thatĝ F increases in one or more individuals' marginal willingness to pay for the public good. Suppose for example that a contributor's willingness to pay for the public good goes up, which makes her contribute more, thus increasing G. This will generally lower the marginal utility of the public good to others, who will therefore substitute towards the private goods and thus may require more compensating public good for any cartel price increase.
The policy can, however, never be socially optimal, as the following result reveals.
Proposition 2. In an economy with at least one contributor, the public interest-defense policy can never implement G S .
Proof. For contributor j, the rst-order conditions require that 14
be satised with equality, since the contribution condition g j ≥ 0 is not binding. Since
∂G / ∂Ui(.) ∂xi = 0 for every i = 1, ..., n, the presence of only one contributor in the economy already implies that the Samuelson condition (2) is violated.
The public-interest defense cannot implement the Samuelson condition in economies with contributors, because of private substitution eects. Even though the overall level of public good in the economy is increasing in g F , no matter how highĝ F is, a contributor will always substitute away from the public good in a manner that prevents achieving the rst-best. To contributors, the rms' provision is a mere wealth injection, which moves out the social optimum and makes it unattainable by collusion. The highest possible improvement of welfare in a contributor economy is attained by requiring the cartel to spend all of its cartel prots (or more) on the public good, yet there is no guarantee that this is sucient to compensate consumers. Government can still engineer a socially optimal cartel by rst increasing g N to push the economy into no-contributors equilibrium, and subsequently set welfare weights that require the cartel to contribute up to G S .
Sustainability of a Compensating Cartel
While it may be possible to compensate consumers for a cartel price rise through public good provision, it is not obvious that the required compensation can be paid for out of the cartel proceeds. Note that the individuals that are hardest to compensate with public good need not be the ones who suered the most harm by the price increase. There may well be consumers that derive too little utility from G to be compensated eectively, even if they have not suered much damage from the price increase at all. In this respect, public good compensation is very dierent from monetary compensation, which will never need to go beyond making the old bundle aordable again. On compensation via a public interest, there is no eective upper limit. The public interest compensation scheme thus proves to be potentially costly, quite possibly too costly to be nanced from the cartel price overcharge on the private good.
In order for the compensation scheme to be incentive compatible for the cartel, each rm's costs of contributing to the public good cannot exceed the extra prots it yields by the higher price. Assuming that the colluding rms have ecient means of splitting the cost of producingĝ F , the industry's sustainability condition is
where Π(.) are the joint prots of rms engaged in the collusive agreement and paying for the public good. 28 The cartel prefers condition (10) to hold with the strictest possible inequality, but cartel prots may be constrained by residual competition. 29 For a public interest defense to be possible, conditions (4) and (10) need to be satised simultaneously. The following characteristic of the policy works against sustainability.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium,
∂G is nonincreasing in x i for all i = 1, ..., n. Proof. Rewriting individual utility as
the rst-order condition readily becomes
dgi is individual i's expectation about the change in the contribution to the public good purchases by other sources as a consequence of the change in the size of his own contribution. In a Nash equilibrium, dG e −i dgi = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, so that the second rst-order condition reduces to
for nonzero levels of individual's public good contributions, irrespective of the level of p x . Marginal utility ∂Ui(.)
∂xi is positive and decreasing x i and therefore so is ∂Ui(.) ∂G , the marginal willingness to pay for the public good, for given prices. If an individual's marginal willingness to pay for the public good is nonpositive in equilibrium, so that he is a non-contributor, small changes in his consumption of x will not make it positive.
The policy is orthogonal to Lindahl-pricing: rather than individuals contributing to the public good according to their willingness to pay, those who have a low marginal willingness to pay for the public 28 Alternatively, we may ask if the cartel is able to pay for the required public good provision out of its price overcharge, that is whether
i is the level of consumption of the private good under the cartel regime. This is equivalent to condition (10) in the case of perfect competition at constant marginal costs considered in Section 4. Holding with equality, this formulation is analogous to the balanced budget requirement in the taxation literature. 29 As explained in Section 2, sucient residual competition in the market remaining is formally a requirement for obtaining a cartel exemption, but in practice it appears not to have been required directly on the cartellized product market. Due to the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis, we ignore welfare eects from any surplus cartel prots net of compensation that would be distributed over individuals in the economy. As long as this reallocation does not change the total wealth of contributors, as it does not in no-contributors and all-contributors economies, by Bergstrom et al. (1986) surplus cartel prots do not aect the total level of public goods in equilibrium. Obviously, deadweight losses increase with cartel prots.
good are targeted to pay most. The reason is that the public good is nanced through raising the price of the private good x, which is consumed most by individuals with a relatively low willingness to pay for G. In Chicken of Tomorrow, the consumers of cheap chicken meat have already revealed not to care much for chicken welfare. It is vegetarians who are most likely to have the highest willingness to pay for more animal friendly broiling. In the matter of the coal burning electricity plants, households that already purposely buy wind or solar power are particularly willing to pay for a reduction in CO 2 emissions, not grey electricity users. The cartel thus has to compensate those individuals with the lowest willingness to pay most, which is expensive.
In addition, a relative preference for the private good over the public good manifests itself in a lot of private good consumption and little private contribution to the public good. Those individuals who consume a large amount of the private good thus have a large exposure to damage from even a small cartel price increase. They value the public good relatively little and also have low mitigating substitution towards the rest of the economy. To the extent that they did contribute to the public good in the competitive equilibrium, they will respond with relatively large reductions, crowding out the compensation.
Note also that in no-contributors economiesĝ F generally increases in g N . A higher level of the initial provision of the public good implies a lower marginal willingness to pay for the public goods for each individual, as consumers cannot substitute away from it. Utility loss from the cartel price increase, however, is unaected by the level of g N . As a result, each unit of g F provided by the rms compensates consumers less than it would with less g N in the economy, so that more compensation is required.
These policy characteristics together make that the industry may not be able to aord the required compensation: if the cartel attempted to increase revenues in order to pay for its compensation requirement with higher prices, an even larger compensating contribution would be required. Whether or not the public interest-defense can nevertheless be sustainable turns out to be case specic. In the next section we analyze a common preference structure and show that while there exist economies in which sustainable public interest defenses exist, they are a small and special subset of all economies.
4
Sustainable Public Interest-Defenses Suppose preferences can be represented by well-behaved constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, that is, let the preferences of individual i be represented by
in which (a i , b i , c i ) are positive parameters expressing relative preferences for the public good, the private good x i and the composite commodity y i , and θ = 1/ρ ∈ (0, 1), satisfying the general conditions imposed in the previous section. All individuals are consumers in the relevant market.
Consumer i is a contributor to be public good if and only if
and g i = 0 otherwise. Note that a wealthy enough individual will contribute to the public good, and at lower wealth levels if a i is high and g N is low.
The optimal level of public good for this economy is
which increases in each individuals' marginal willingness to pay for the public good a i .
Firms produce good x at constant marginal costs c, so that p x = c. Denoting market demand for good x at price p x as D x (p x ), under the weighted average compensation requirement to produceĝ F , collusion is protable for the industry only if
where the demand at price p c x naturally depends also onĝ F as it enters the consumer's optimization problem. good more. Eventually, types 2 will become non-contributors. Industry prot is given by the lower solid line: no price rise exists for which the cartel can actually aord the compensating public good level required. Even though all consumers have a revealed willingness to pay for the public good, no sustainable public interest-defense can be mounted.
The example captures that the policy targets consumers with a high consumption of the private good, whom are damaged a lot by the cartel price rise, to pay for the public good, for which they have a relatively low preference, while the cartel provision crowds out private contributions in addition.
Yet, there are specications for which the cartel prot is positive for some price range and identies, since Π is concave for constant elasticity of substitution-type demands, a unique viable optimal cartel strategy under the compensation requirement. 31 In the following, we study the set of parameters for which a sustainable public interest-defense is possible. Section 4.1 considers the case without private contributions to the public good. In Section 4.2 there are private contributions.
No-contributors Economy
Suppose condition (12) is not satised for any individual i, so that g i = 0 for all i and only G = g N +g F enters into every individual's utility. The compensating amount of public goodĝ F for this economy decreases in consumers' relative preference for the public good (a i ), in accordance with Proposition 
If a large proportion of consumers has a strong preference for the public good, that is if a i is large for suciently many (or heavily weighted) individuals, the left hand-side of (15) increases, making compensation more sustainable. The right hand-side increases analogously in b i . Note also that the right hand-side of (15) increases in both p g , as producing the public good is more expensive, and g N , reecting that the willingness to pay for additional public goods provision decreases in the existing public good level. In fact, if g N is low enough, it will become possible to sustainably collude and compensate -yet it will also induce individuals to contribute privately for lower wealth levels. In addition, the closer θ is to 0, the less constraining (12) is, reecting that utility becomes near linear in all goods. Figure 3 shows the space for a sustainable public-interest defense for a no-contributors economy with two types. 33 Type 1's preferences for the public and the private good are varied, relative to a xed non-contributing type 2, at I2. The cartel marginally increases the price from p x = c. The dashed line marks the preferences for which type 1 will remain a non-contributor too. The solid line depicts sustainability condition (15). Together, the two lines mark a bandwidth in which the ratio of a 1 to b 1 should stay for a public-interest defense to be sustainable in this economy. That is, type 1's preference weights for the public and the private good should jointly increase and not diverge much.
While possibilities for compensation requires a suciently high value of a 1 , relative to b 1 , a 1 should not become too high, or type 1 becomes a contributor. If, on the other hand, b 1 increases above the solid line, type 1 likes the private good so much, the cartel cannot protably compensate him.
The specic shape and location of the space of
values for which a public interest-defense is sustainable depends on all other parameters of the economy. The higher g N , for example, the more both the sustainability and the type 1 contributor boundary move to the right, leaving more or less the same space for aligned preferences. The example is non-specic however: generally the relative preferences for the private and public good should stay within narrow bounds.
As noted, the policy could be socially engineered in this economy to be rst-best by choosing the individual welfare weights appropriately. For example, with preferences of both types in the sustainable public interest-defense space, for a discrete price increase from one to two, the cartel is made to compensate to the socially optimal public good level if individual type 1 has a weight roughly 32 The expression forĝ F is equation (19) in the appendix, which also serves as an illustration of Proposition 1. 33 Parameter values are: α 1 = α 2 ; c 1 = 1; (a 2 , b 2 , c 2 ) = (1, 1, 1); θ = 1 3
; (w 1 , w 2 ) = (10, 10); g N = 10; (px, py, pg) =
(1, 1, 1).
Figure 3: Sustainable public interest-defense space in a no-contributors economy.
two-and-a-half times that of type 2. The cartel contributes in that case almost three times the natural public goods level. 34
Contributor Economies
In an economy in which at least some individuals are private contributors to the public good, the crowding out eect comes into play. Suppose condition (12) is satised for all individuals, which is the case if they all have high enough wealth endowments. The level of public good in equilibrium then is proportional to the total value of the endowment in the economy, so that consistent with Bergstrom et al. (1986) , lump-sum reallocation of wealth have no eect on the total level of public goods in equilibrium. However, the cartel overcharge changes consumption bundles through substitution and income eects, so that crowing out in a contributor economy is not full.
The compensating cartel contributionĝ F is sustainable in an all-contributor economy for an innitesimal cartel price rise if and only if
in which i =j i,j is the sum over all unique pairs of two dierent individuals (i, j) in the total n. 35 Since dierent levels of initial public good are essentially variations in wealth, condition (16) does not depend on g N . Sustainability depends critically on the relationships between preferences for the private, the public and the composite commodity. Note that it does not depend on prices, apart from p g , the price of the public good, for which, since ρ > 1, it naturally holds that the more expensive it is to compensate consumers, the harder it is to do so from the cartel proceeds. Given welfare weights, since the left-hand side of (16) is positive and the right-hand side is a subtraction, it can be satised for a wide variety of parameter values. What matters is the`distance' in preferences between pairs of individuals, in all three goods. Certainly, supposing all individuals receive the same weight (i.e. if α i = α j for all (i, j)),
if everybody values the public good equally (i.e. if a i = a j for all (i, j)), it will always be possible to compensate all consumers in a contributor economy protably. The same is true if all individuals value both the public good and the composite commodity equally (i.e. if b i = b j and c i = c j for all (i, j)). In both cases, the right-hand side of (16) is zero.
Around these limit identity cases is a range of dierent preference structures for which compensation is possible as well, as long as consumers are suciently homogeneous in their valuation of the three goods in society. If the values of a i are far apart between pairs of individuals, the right-hand side of (16) will be larger and compensation not sustainable, unless the combined preferences for the private goods x and y are very close, so that the last part of the right hand-side of the condition goes to zero.
The cross-multiplications of b i and c j reect the fact that cartel damage is mitigated by substitution towards the composite commodity when p x rises. Figure 4 is an all-contributors economy with two types, induced by a lower level of g N in otherwise the same example as above. 36 In the region in which both types contribute, between the dashed lines, the ratio a1 b 1 stays relatively constant. Given that a2 b2 = 1, if individuals are more dierent than quite alike in their preferences, it will not be possible to mount a sustainable public interest-defense. In the upper-left region, type 1 has insucient liking of the public good to contribute, whereas in the lower-right region his contribution is so large that it crowds out type 2's. Compensation is sustainable within the region between the solid lines, by which (a 1 , b 1 ) are bounded away from zero and cannot be too high. Compensation is in principle possible close to the vertical axis, as long as type 1 is suciently wealthy, where the cartel would make sucient prot on his large consumption of the private good.
To the lower-right, type 1 likes the public good enough to be easy to compensate. The upper-limit on sustainability bounds the parameter space in which compensation is sustainable in an all-contributors economy, relative to the importance of the rest of the economy.
The higher g N , the wider the bandwidth within which consumers are (non)contributors, while the sustainability bound remains the same. The location of the sustainability upper-bound depends on 35 The expression forĝ F is equation (20) in the appendix, which also serves as an illustration of Proposition 1. 36 Parameter values are: α 1 = α 2 ; c 1 = 1; (a 2 , b 2 , c 2 ) = (1, 1, 1); θ = This is the case even though consumers decrease their contributions in response to the policy. Hybrid economies in fact combine the presence of a high willingness to pay for the public good in some portion of the population, with non-contributors that aggravate the problem of under-provision. In addition, individual contributions to the public good in an economy in competition are further discouraged by free-riding when the number of individuals is larger. Together with the fact that the cartel provision benets more people over which the cost of producing the public good can be spread, this widens the space for improvement by the policy.
The exact composition of preferences and wealth endowments, however, remains crucial for the possibilities to mount a sustainable and eective public-interest defense. Also, the cartel provision, the accompanying increase in the price of the private good, and all responses to it will potentially turn consumers from contributor to non-contributor or vice versa. The nding remains that the existence of a critical mass of consumers who combine a low marginal utility for the public good with high purchases of the private good can easily make an eective public-interest cartel impossible.
5
Alternative Welfare Measures
The construction of a welfare function to comply with the case law that consumers in the same relevant market are compensated is cardinal, as noted. As a result, the policy does not oer an unambiguous welfare standard to guide the agency's balancing exercise. In conditions (15) and (16), the choice of weights in the welfare function α i directly aects the sustainability condition: it can be possible to weigh certain individuals in such a way that a cartel will not be able to compensate the consumers protably -and vice versa. 37
Alternative norms may allow for a more practical approach. Consumer surplus may seem an empirically viable measure, yet even as an approximation of welfare it is not well-dened, as demand for the public good does not integrate even for standard preferences. Also, while aggregate demand for the private goods is observable, that for the public good is not.
The Pareto criterion certainly is more strict, as a single individual with no willingness to pay for the public good would hold up any possibilities for a public-interest defense. At the same time, it may be easier to assess for a competition agency. Consider an all-contributors economy in which one individual h is the hardest to compensate. The linear approximation of minimal individual-specic level of public good required with general utility functions is
In the case of constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, the cartel can aord the impliedĝ F,h if and only if
in which
is the sum over all individuals other than h. While this condition is considerably simpler than condition (16) and requires no welfare function, still information is needed about the preferences of all consumers to implement it, since all individuals interact through the public good contributions.
Also note that asking for potential Pareto improvements, for which those who are better o could compensate those who are worse o, as proposed in the Kaldor-Hicks-criteria, is not obvious either.
This criterion is less stringent than the Pareto-criterion, but it still requires a full comparative statics analysis. Moreover, in economies with contributors any redistribution of wealth among contributors does not change individual utilities by the neutrality result in Bergstrom et al. (1986) , and so KaldorHicks compensation oers no solution. In the no-contributors economy, the information required to establish whether potential compensations exist remains staggering. It is not clear whether the relevant case law discussed in Section 2 would allow the potential Pareto criterion.
Finally, a more practical approach may be to try to measure the maximum willingness to pay for the promised cartel public good contribution by consumers of the private good and compare it to the projected cartel price increase. 38 In principle, if the average willingness to pay for the new equilibrium public goods level is larger than the price increase, the public-interest defense would be allowed and otherwise not. For small increases in an all-contributors economy, the approach seems straightforward:
for an increase in the public good provision the average willingness to pay is equal to the current price of the public good p g . 39
However, such a test is generally not strict enough, since the price increase of the private good will lead to substitution towards private contributions to the public good, which will lower the willingness to pay for further contributions by the cartel. In addition, once some compensation is given, consumer's willingness to pay for the public good will be lowered further. Therefore, even if the (average) willingness to pay for the public good would be found to be higher than the cartel price increase, i.e. 
Concluding Remarks
The public interest-defense policy seeks to exempt horizontal agreements from the cartel law if they advance certain public interests, such as public health or the environment, enough to compensate the consumers damaged by their anti-competitive eects. The collusive provision of public goods proves cumbersome, however. A cartel could improve upon the under-provision of public goods in competitive equilibrium, yet it will contribute the minimum required, which in no-contributor economies decreases in consumers' willingness to pay, contrary to the Samuelson condition. When there is at least one 38 This approach was taken by the Dutch competition agency in the matter of the coal burning electricity plants and Chicken of Tomorrow. See ACM (2013) and ACM (2015) . 39 For the no-contributors economy, we obtain the overall willingness to pay at a point G = g N as p
, which is not obvious to establish empirically. 25 private contributor to be public good in the economy, the policy can never attain rst-best because of crowding out.
Moreover, public good provision by a private cartel is orthogonal to Lindahl-pricing, as those individuals who have self-selected themselves, through their private good consumption, as relatively low willingness to pay for the public good types, are targeted to pay most for the provision of a compensating public good that they value least. As a result, the cartel will often not be able to compensate protably. Only when suciently many consumers have relative preferences for the cartellized private commodity and the public good that stays constant within narrow bounds, may a sustainable public interest-defense exist. The space for sustainable compensation is particularly small if the market for the cartellized private good is not too large relative to the rest of the economy.
The policies saddle competition authorities with a conict of public interests. The conditions for sucient compensation prove complex and the information requirements on a competition agency that is to practically implement the policy seem prohibitively large. Even if an unambiguous welfare assessment were possible -or when the Pareto criterion would be applied -to identify whether a given market satises the compensation condition, perfect information is needed of all consumers' preferences. While consumer choices reveal some information about their valuation of public goods, this is far from sucient. Given the narrow set of economies and the precise sizes of compensating public good contributions required, a false assessment is quite probable. Complexity is added by allowing exemptions on future benets as well. 40 Even if corporations had the best intentions to meet the policy criteria, the diculty to self-assess whether their intended agreement would qualify for an exemption leaves a lot of legal uncertainty. With good or bad intentions, industries have an incentive to exaggerate their contribution. The capacity of a competition agency to eectively monitor rm contributions lacking, rms may just take advantage of the policy and provide some cosmetic public good in exchange for a free pass to collude. A cartel exempted will raise prices by as much as it possibly can, doing as little for the public interest as it can get away with.
Our model has wider application in competition policy context. It applies to companies in a position of dominance pricing excessively in return for promoting a public interest. Likewise does our analysis extend to price rises from various forms of (partial) cartels that face remaining fringe competition, or mergers that are cleared with public interest remedies, such as avoiding job losses. In the latter cases, rms' ability to raise prices and prots will be limited, which would leave an even narrower space for sustainable public interest contributions than under full collusion.
We have abstracted from public interest benets that result directly from a reduction in the con- 40 In a revision of the Dutch policy rule referenced in footnote 6, in force since 5 October 2016, the assessment is to involve: ". . . quantitative and qualitative benets for users that materialize in the long." In paragraph 3.3 on page 9 of the revised policy rule, this is explained as: "With this approach, the benets both to the current consumer in the future, as well to future consumers of the product or service concerned are taken into account: it is about a longer term than right here, right now, and others that do not themselves consume the product." sumption of private commodities that generate negative externalities, such as smoking or polluting production, that may result from a cartel price increase. Including them as compensating cartel benets does not change our qualitative ndings. In particular do we note that arguably those individuals who consume most of products that harm the public interest will generally care less for the public benets, or they wouldn't generate the externalities. A cartel price overcharge in this context can be seen as a uniform Pigovian tax on those individuals that cause the negative externality by consumption. Constrained by competition case law, the cartel price rise can, however, not exceed the average of Lindahl prices in the subgroup of individuals with the lowest willingness to pay. Also, we model all public interests in the form of a single public good that enters independently into preferences, as a substitute for spending on private consumption. In many cases, for example cars and road safety, private and public goods may be complementary, so that the demand for the private good increases as the provision of the public good rises. 41 When the cartel produces the complementary public good in compensation, it can benet from an increased demand eect that would possibly relax the sustainability constraint.
Finally, we note that public goods often have a local character. For the provision that consumers in the same relevant market are compensated, it is necessary that the cartel contributes to a compensating public good in that market, or otherwise possibly to various dierent local public goods that together span all consumers aected by the cartel price overcharge for compensation. The latter case would complicate enforcement accordingly. While public interest benets may (far) exceed the relevant market, they must minimally cover it by the European Treaty provisions.
The case law requirement that consumers are to be compensated on average, rather than all, introduces a fundamental equity matter as well. The compensating public good provision that will preserve utility on average will still harm consumers with a low marginal valuation of the public good.
Consumers with a low preference for the private good and a relatively high willingness to pay for the public good are eectively paying less, in terms of damage suered by the price increase, than the consumers targeted by the policy: those who buy substantial volumes of the private good. This heterogeneity in impacts is much more pronounced than it would be in a system of (capped) monetary compensations. The Pareto criterion does not suer from these problems, yet if indeed it cannot apply for legal reasons, the trade-os seem for political, rather than bureaucratic decision making.
It appears to remain that public interests call for government provision and regulation, paid for by taxation -certainly if government had the information required to assess public-interest cartel defenses.
By tendering the private production of public goods, it is possible to tap into superior corporate knowledge and capabilities to promote public interests most eciently also. Sector knowledge can be involved in the drafting of regulation as well, which would vertically impose more sustainable production conditions without the need for horizontal agreements. To the extent that this raises the cost of production, it would do so symmetrically across all rm in the industry and thus increase consumer prices in competition by no more than necessary.
In some cases, jurisdictional or political barriers, eective lobbies and stubborn creative compliance may render government regulation problematic. Yet, allowing a public interest-cartel seems hardly an eective workaround for a well meaning agency operating in a intergovernmental vacuum. In the cases so far seen, the more traditional government interventions were perfectly available. Energy inecient household appliances and coal burning electricity plants can simply be phased out by law, as cruelty to animals can be made illegal by putting minimum living conditions for chicken in place. More than a conviction that competition agencies are best placed to balance dierent public interests, the introduction of the public interest-defense seems to reect a lack of political will to regulate, or, more concerning even, a politicking of antitrust.
Appendix -Derivations of the Model in Sections 4 and 5
Consumer i ∈ {1, .., N } has a wealth endowment w i and a utility function
For consumer i, the budget constraint is (normalizing p y = 1)
with g i ≥ 0. First-order conditions for consumer i with no bounds for g i are .
Welfare in the two equilibria equal,
after expressing the equilibrium level of the public good yields the minimally required compensation 
The derivative of the costs of compensation evaluated at point p Assume consumer h is the most dicult to compensate individual in society. In the all-contributor economy, the required compensation for consumer h iŝ
By similar algebra as above, 
